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COMMENTS
THE CONTEMPORANEOUS OBJECTION RULE:
TIME FOR A RE-EXAMINATION
INTRODUCTION
In dozens of opinions issued in criminal cases each year by
the appellate courts of Kentucky, language to this effect may
be found: "It is well settled in this Commonwealth that with-
out a timely and proper objection at trial alleged errors are not
properly preserved for appellate review."' Indeed, this
"contemporaneous objection" rule has been recognized by the
text writers2 and the judiciary3 as "elementary," and embodied
in the Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.4 Yet the courts
still find it necessary to reiterate the rule,5 and the Kentucky
Supreme Court has begun to show signs of increasing impati-
ence with those who seek to ignore or skirt around it.'
This comment will explore the background of this rule. In
addition, it will note various exceptions which have been recog-
nized by the Kentucky courts in the past, as well as the current
attitude of the Kentucky courts toward the rule. Finally, it will
explore the validity of the rule in light of judicial efficiency,
I Walker v. Commonwealth, 561 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Ky. 1978).
2 See, e.g., R. LAWSON, KENTUCKY EvmENcF LAW HAMBOOK 5-6 (1976). See also
D. MURRELL, KENTUCKY CRIMINAL PRACTICE 190, 195-96, 198 (1975).
Collins v. Commonwealth, 297 S.W.2d 54, 56 (Ky. 1956); Ramsey v. Common-
wealth, 267 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Ky. 1954); Warren v. Commonwealth, 256 S.W.2d 368,
370 (Ky. 1953).
See KY. R. CrmM. P. 9.22 [hereinafter cited as R. CR.].
'See, e.g., Stewart v. Commonwealth, 561 S.W.2d 660 (Ky. 1977); Hunter v.
Commonwealth, 560 S.W.2d 808 (Ky. 1977); Garrett v. Commonwealth, 560 S.W.2d
805 (Ky. 1977); Queen v. Commonwealth, 551 S.W.2d 239 (Ky. 1977); Newell v. Com-
monwealth, 549 S.W.2d 89 (Ky. 1977); Lee v. Commonwealth, 547 S.W.2d 792 (Ky.
1977); Price v. Commonwealth, 474 S.W.2d 348 (Ky. 1971); Robinson v. Common-
wealth, 474 S.W.2d 107 (Ky. 1971); Higdon v. Commonwealth, 473 S.W.2d 110 (Ky.
1971); Patton v. Commonwealth, 273 S.W.2d 841 (Ky. 1954); Ramsey v. Common-
wealth, 267 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1954); Manz v. Commonwealth, 257 S.W.2d 581 (Ky.
1953); Hurd v. Commonwealth, 210 S.W.2d 938 (Ky. 1948); Combs v. Commonwealth,
104 S.W. 261 (Ky. 1907).
' See notes 76-82 and accompanying text infra for examples of this judicial impati-
ence.
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fairness to the criminal defendant, and recent amendments to
the Kentucky Constitution.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE RULE
A. The Pre-Criminal Rules Era
The general rule calling for preclusion of appellate review
for failure to object to an error of the trial court or an action of
the prosecutor at trial was first codified in Kentucky in 1854.
7
Coming at a time when the right to an appeal was not as
ingrained as it is today,8 this rule must have seemed a relatively
minor restriction. The rule was soon accepted by the courts'
and it was accompanied by various justifications.
In Burns v. Commonwealth"5 the Court noted that the ori-
gins of the contemporaneous objection rule were in civil prac-
tice and the Civil Code." Quoting from a recent civil appeal,
the Court stated:
'The policy of this requisition is obvious. Matters which are
regarded as of little importance at the time, and are, for that
reason, allowed to pass unnoticed, are thus finally disposed
of, and can not be afterward relied upon as erroneous. Each
party... has an opportunity afforded him of correcting the
error, if one has been committed, or of avoiding it, if about
to be committed. Instructions may be asked which, if ob-
I See THE 1854 CODE OF PRACTICE IN CRMNAL CASES IN KENTUCKY § 277 (Myers
1867) [hereinafter cited as 1854 CRMnNAL CODE]. See also 1854 CRUMNAL CODE § 334,
governing felony appeals: "A judgment of conviction shall only be reversed for the
following errors of law to the defendant's prejudice appearing on the record . .. ."
(emphasis added). A similar provision appeared in § 348 of the 1854 Cma.INAL CODE
which governed appeals of misdemeanor convictions.
I As late as 1852, the law in Kentucky was: "No writ of error or appeal [in the
court of appeals] shall lie in cases of felony. . . ." REvisED STATUTES OF KENTucKY
ch. XXVII, art. 1, § 1 (Wickliffe, Turner & Nicholas 1852). Thus the changes made in
1854, discussed briefly in note 7 supra, were radical even with the contemporaneous
objection rule.
See, e.g., Adwell v. Commonwealth, 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) 310, 316-18 (1856).
" 60 Ky. (3 Met.) 13 (1860).
" Id. at 16-17. ThE 1854 CODE OF PRACTICE IN CIviL CASES IN KENTucKY § 364
(Myers 1867) [hereinafter cited as 1854 CivrL CODE] provided; "the party objecting
to a decision of the court must except at the time the decision is made." (Technically,
there is a distinction between an "objection" and an "exception." However, for the
purposes of this comment, the terms may be interchanged without detracting from the
analysis. Under R. Cr. 9.22, formal exceptions to rulings of the court are no longer
necessary in Kentucky trial courts, although objections are necessary.)
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jected to,would not be insisted on, or if insisted upon, would
not be given by the court, but which might be given if no
objection was made to them. For this reason the error in
instruction is deemed to be waived, unless the instruction be
objected to at the time it is given.'12
Clearly the court was concerned with the efficiency of the rule:
when disputes are brought before the trial judge, the opportun-
ity is greater that a "correct" decision will be made and thus
will not need to be made at another time.
In Branson v. Commonwealth" the Court added a new
rationale for the rule: "This is fair to [the trial judge]. The
matter is likely then to receive more careful attention from
him."
It was not until 1902, however, that the Court gave any
detailed consideration to the rule's fairness to the defendant. 5
In Buckles v. Commonwealth,"5 the Court took as its basic
premise the notion that errors at trial were almost inevitable."
[TIherefrom arises the policy of the rule that the trial court's
attention must be called to the proceeding that is objected to,
and to the ruling upon which a reversal is to be sought, in
order that a fair trial of accused persons may be had as speed-
ily as possible, and the ends of justice attained by the means
which human experience shows best adapted to the purpos'e.
12 60 Ky. (3 Met.) at 17 (quoting Kennedy & Bro. v. Cunningham, 59 Ky. (2 Met.)
538, 540 (1859)). See also Letton v. Young, 59 Ky. (2 Met.) 558 (1859). For a modem
restatement of this rule and reasoning, see LAWSON, supra note 2, at 7-8: "The initial
responsibility for shielding the jury from incompetent evidence is shouldered by the
parties. When such evidence is offered, the party opposing its introduction must object
to its admissibility or be held to have waived all objections to its competency."
13 17 S.W. 1019 (Ky. 1891). -
1' Id. at 1020. See also Buckles v. Commonwealth, 68 S.W. 1084 (Ky. 1902).
Buckles contains a detailed analysis of the contemporaneous objection rule under the
1854 Criminal Code and its 1880 amendments. Id. at 1085.
1 Cf. McClure v. Commonwealth, 81 Ky. 448 (1883), in which the felony convic-
tion of a fourteen-year-old was reversed, since "it [did] not affirmatively appear that
[he] had an attorney present and watching [his] interest during the whole of the
trial." Id. at 449.
,68 S.W. 1084 (Ky. 1902).
" "We know that, in the hurry and distraction of court-room practice, errors must
occur; that matters will occur to distract the attention; and that errors and inadvert-
ences result from the mere physical strain and fatigue of courtroom service ... " Id.
at 1086.
I" Id. As further justification for the rule, the court added:
It is to be presumed that the trial court will correct an error to which its
[Vol. 67
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Fifteen years after Buckles, the Court offered another ex-
planation for the rule. In Martin v. Commonwealth,19 the ap-
pellant claimed that the trial court had erred in not granting
him a change of venue. His argument fell on deaf ears. The
Court explained that since he had not asked the trial court for
a change of venue, the trial court had been powerless to grant
one. It added: "This court is a court of review, and upon ap-
peals it is restricted to the duty of determining the soundness
and correctness of the decisions and actions of the tribunals of
original jurisdiction, from whose judgments appeals are prose-
cuted. 20 Since the trial court had made no "decision" or taken
no "action" in this regard, it was beyond the power of the Court
.of Appeals to act.
By 1931 the policies behind the contemporaneous objec-
tion rule had crystallized such that the Court of Appeals could
make the following summary:
Appellate courts are now fully burdened with cases, and they
should not be further burdened until every effort has been
made in the lower court to correct errors without avail ....
By . . .calling the trial court's attention to the error and
giving it an opportunity to correct it, the time of the litigants
in bringing a case to this court and getting it reversed and the
expense to the litigants involved in that procedure will be
saved. The rule... is not only fair to the litigants but also
to the trial court and this court.
21
B. Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.22
The rule on failure to preserve for appellate review through
lack of appropriate objection has been codified (or recodifled)
in Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (R. Cr.) 9.22. A lead-
attention is called. It is to be presumed that the court will not rule erro-
neously if proper objection is made. It is to be presumed, also, that the
defendant acquiesces in that to which he does not object, and is satisfied
with the rulings to which he does not except.
, 199 S.W. 603 (Ky. 1917).
Id. at 610.
z Jones v. Commonwealth, 38 S.W.2d 251, 254 (Ky. 1931).
1 R. Cr. 9.22 states:
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary; but
for all purposes for which an exception has heretofore been necessary it is
sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made
1978-79]
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ing case construing R. Cr. 9.22 is Hartsock v. Commonwealth,2
in which the defendant asserted that certain jury instructions
were improper. The Court concluded that it could not consider
the alleged errors, stating:
[W]e construe R. Cr. 9.22, 9.5411 and 10.122 as meaning that
although it is not necessary to raise objection to the instruc-
tions at the time they are given, it is imperative that claimed
errors in instructions, given or omitted, be presented to the
trial court at some time, either by proper objection or by
motion, and certainly no later than the motion for a new trial,
before they may receive appellate review. . . . The underly-
ing principle of the rule is to afford an opportunity to the trial
court, before or during the trial or hearing, to rule upon the
question raised.26
The Court had another opportunity to construe R. Cr. 9.22
in Hatton v. Commonwealth.Y Like Hartsock, Hatton arose
under the old version of R. Cr. 9 .54 ,2 which pertains to objec-
or sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires the court
to take or his objection to the action of the court, and on request of the court,
his grounds therefor; and, if a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling
or order at the time it is made, the absence of an objection does not thereafter
prejudice him.
382 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1964).
In 1964, R. Cr. 9.54 read as follows:
Rule 9.54 Instructions. - (1) It shall be the duty of the court to instruct
the jury in writing on the law of the case. The instructions shall be read to
the jury prior to the closing summations ok counsel.
(2) It shall not be necessary in order to preserve error that objections
to instructions be made during the trial, but unless so made they must be
presented in a motion for a new trial. No objection shall be sufficient unless
the specific grounds are stated.
This rule was amended October 10, 1973, effective March 1, 1974. It now reads in
relevant part:
(2) No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an
instruction unless he has fairly and adequately presented his position by an
offered instruction or by motion, or unless he makes objection before the
court instructs the jury, stating specifically the matter to which he objects
and the ground or grounds of his objection.
21 R. Cr. 10.12:
Preservation of error. - Allegations of error, properly preserved by objec-
tions as provided in these rules, in respect to rulings, orders or instruction
of the court need not be presented in a motion for a new trial in order to be
preserved for appellate review.
382 S.W.2d at 864 (footnotes added).
409 S.W.2d 818 (Ky. 1967).
21 See note 24 supra, where the two versions are set out.
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tions to jury instructions. The Court found, referring to R. Cr.
9.22, that "the policy of R. Cr. 9.22 is to require a defendant
in a criminal case. . . to present to the trial court those ques-
tions of law which may become issues on appeal." 9 Averring
to the reasoning of the pre-rules days,3" the Court added: "The
appellate court reviews for errors, and a non-ruling cannot be
erroneous when the issue has not been presented to the trial
court for decision."'3
Since the advent of the Criminal Rules 32 many decisions
have cited R. Cr. 9.22 as authority for the court's denial of ap-
pellate review of certain issues.33 However, there are a great
number of opinions handed down each year denying appel-
late review which cite either no authority whatsoever, 34 or
cite only cases, not the Criminal Rules.35 Such treatment may
409 S.W.2d at 819 (emphasis supplied by Court).
See notes 7-21 supra and accompanying text for court reasoning during this era.
' 409 S.W.2d at 819-20. See also Turner v. Commonwealth, 460 S.W.2d 345 (Ky.
1970), in which the defendant alleged error in the trial court's failure to appoint counsel
for appellants or obtain their waiver of counsel at arraignment. The Court held, on the
authority of R. Cr. 9.22 and 10.12 and the Hatton and Hartsock cases, that the alleged
error had not been preserved for appellate review. Accord, Caslin v. Commonwealth,
491 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. 1973).
3 The Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure became effective on January 1,
1963. 1962 Ky. Acts, ch. 234.
13 See, e.g., Bowers v. Commonwealth, 555 S.W.2d 241 (Ky. 1977); McDonald v.
Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d 84 (Ky. 1977); Sturgill v. Commonwealth, 516 S.W.2d 652
(Ky. 1974); Sasaki v. Commonwealth, 485 S.W.2d 897 (Ky. 1972); Russell v. Common-
wealth, 482 S.W.2d 584 (Ky. 1972); Hunter v. Commonwealth, 479 S.W.2d 4 (Ky.
1972); Franklin v. Commonwealth, 477 S.W.2d 788 (Ky. 1972); Price v. Common-
wealth, 474 SW.2d 348 (Ky. 1971); Robinson v. Commonwealth, 474 S.W.2d 107 (Ky.
1971); Conover v. Commonwealth, 473 S.W.2d 825 (Ky. 1971); Turner v. Common-
wealth, 460 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970); Koester v. Commonwealth, 449 S.W.2d 213 (Ky.
1969); Hood v. Commonwealth, 448 S.W.2d 388 (Ky. 1969); Patrick v. Commonwealth,
436 S.W.2d 69 (Ky. 1968); Arnold v. Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 355 (Ky. 1968);
Hatton v. Commonwealth, 409 S.W.2d 818 (Ky. 1966); York v. Commonwealth, 395
S.W.2d 781 (Ky. 1965); Piper v. Commonwealth, 387 S.W.2d 13 (Ky. 1965); Hartsock
v. Commonwealth, 382 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1964); Hurt v. Commonwealth, 378 S.W.2d
726 (Ky. 1964); Furguson v. Commonwealth, 373 S.W.2d 729 (Ky. 1963).
" See, e.g., Hunter v. Commonwealth, 560 S.W.2d 808 (Ky. 1977); Burch v. Com-
monwealth, 555 S.W.2d 954 (Ky. 1977); Brown v. Commonwealth, 551 S.W.2d 557
(Ky. 1977); Eversole v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 513 (Ky. 1977); Newell v. Com-
monwealth, 549 S.W.2d 89 (Ky. 1977); Grider v. Commonwealth, 398 S.W.2d 496 (Ky.
1966); Salisbury v. Commonwealth, 556 S.W.2d 922 (Ky. App. 1977).
"See, e.g., Shannon v. Commonwealth, 562 S.W.2d 301 (Ky. 1978); Walker v.
Commonwealth, 561 S.W.2d 656 (Ky. 1978); Stewart v. Commonwealth, 561 S.W.2d
660 (Ky. 1977); Garrett v. Commonwealth, 560 S.W.2d 805 (Ky. 1977); Crain v. Corn-
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lead the casual reader of the court's opinions, and sometimes
apparently even the courts themselves,38 to infer erroneously
that the decision rests on little or no authority.
A refreshingly detailed and logical opinion setting forth
the bases of R. Cr. 9.22 and its interrelationships with other
Criminal Rules was authored by Judge Park of the new court
of appeals in the summer of 1977. In Salisbury v.
Commonwealth,3" the court considered an appeal"8 from a con-
viction for voluntary manslaughter. The court called R. Cr.
9.22 a "salutary rule[,] because it gives the trial judge an
opportunity to remedy any errors in the proceedings." 9 The
court saw such a rule as necessary, even though it might force
a defendant to forego constitutional objections on appeal."
If a defendant's counsel could not waive constitutional issues
by failing to object during the course of a trial, the trial judge
monwealth, 484 S.W.2d 839 (Ky. 1972); Minor v. Commonwealth, 478 S.W.2d 716 (Ky.
1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Pedigo v. Commonwealth, 416 S.W.2d. 751
(Ky. 1967); Miller v. Commonwealth, CA-1323-MR (Ky. App. Feb. 3, 1978); Harri-
son v. Commonwealth, 559 S.W.2d 744 (Ky. App. 1977).
"See, e.g., England v. Commonwealth, SC-332-MR (Ky. Dec. 9, 1977) (mem. per
curiam). In this case, the court seemed to seize upon Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72 (1977), as justification for its contemporaneous objection rule.
"556 S.W.2d 922 (Ky. App. 1977).
On appeal, the defendant asserted three grounds of error: (1) that the trial judge
erred in declining to disqualify himself from presiding over the case; (2) that the
evidence was insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict on a charge of voluntary man-
slaughter; and (3) that credibility evidence was improperly used by the Common-
wealth's Attorney. Id. at 924-25.
The court held: (1) It could not find error in the trial judge's failure to disqualify
himself, but that even if it could, the error had not been preserved for appellate review
because the motion to vacate the bench had been made too late. Id. at 924. (2) The
instruction for voluntary manslaughter had been properly given and the evidence was
sufficient to support the verdict. Id. at 924-25. (3) Although the prosecutor's comments
were objectionable, no error had been preserved for review since the defendant had not
objected in a timely manner and, in addition, there was no palpable error. Id. at 925-
28. See infra notes 52-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "palpable error
doctrine."
" 556 S.W.2d at 926. See also Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 508 n.3 (1976).
"When a defendant's attorney is aware of an issue and elects to raise
no objection, the attorney's failure to object may constitute a waiver of an
error having constitutional implications. In the absence of exceptional cir-
cumstances, a defendant is bound by the trial strategy adopted by his coun-
sel even if made without prior consultation with the defendant.
556 S.W.2d at 927. Cf. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938): "A waiver is
ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privi-
lege."
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would be placed in an impossible situation.... This court
will not adopt a rule which would require the trial judge to
stop the trial whenever a possible constitutional issue is
raised in order to inquire of counsel and the defendant
whether a waiver is intended."
C. Summary
In surveying the many cases dealing with preservation of
issues for appeal, one sees a broad spectrum of justifications
cited for application of the contemporaneous objection rule.
Despite this, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the
courts are primarily motivated by a desire for judicial effi-
ciency or economy. 2 Whether this justification is strong enough
to counterbalance or outweigh the.defendant's right to an ap-
peal is explored in later sections of this comment.
" 556 S.W.2d at 987. An Alaska court cited in Salisbury reached the same conclu-
sion, adding that:
We are not unaware of the dangers attendant upon resolution of the problems
presented here. The constitutional rights of criminal defendants must be
protected. Attorneys must be allowed to conduct trials as their training and
experience dictate. And the processes of justice must be safeguarded against
crippling delays and unwieldy procedures. We think the answer lies in a
pragmatic approach.
Lanier v. State, 486 P.2d 981, 987 (Alaska 1971). The Alaska court, when faced with
the issue of whether to adopt a rule requiring an attorney to consult with his client
before the client's right may be waived, stated:
Not only would it hamper the attorney, it might force the trial judge to
interrupt the proceedings whenever a waiver might be occurring in order to
protect the record on appeal. If the judge did not do so, the defendant could
later challenge his conviction by asserting that he had not consented to the
waiver. In addition, such a procedure would distract and confuse a jury. If
carried far enough, it could not only slow a trial to a snail's pace, but it might
also involve the judge in the conduct of the defense to an unacceptable
degree.
Id. at 987. Accord, Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93-94 (1977) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring); id. at 94-97 (Stevens, J., concurring).
a See generally Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965). Whether this result is
achieved is questionable. There are exceptions to the general rule, see notes 47-79 and
accompanying text infra, and arguments may well be heard despite a failure to object
in the trial court. Section El B, infra, contains examples of cases, not involving the
recognized exceptions, in which the courts give full treatment to the issues raised but
nevertheless affirm the conviction because of failure to preserve for appellate review.
In addition, there is the possibility that a defendant may proceed under R. Cr. 11.42,
and move to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. See, e.g., Salisbury v. Common-
wealth, 556 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Ky. App. 1977), in which the court expressly left open
the possibility that the defendant, though denied the right to raise issues on direct
appeal, might nevertheless succeed under R. Cr. 11.42.
1978-79]
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II. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE
A. Death Penalty Cases
Kentucky courts have long found an exception to the con-
temporaneous objection rule in cases where the death penalty
has been imposed.4 3 The extremely serious nature of the death
penalty provides a basis for the belief that procedural techni-
calities are of diminished importance in such cases." The
courts have gone so far as to note that "[t]his duty of arresting
a rule of procedure, in a rare case such as this, in order that
justice may be done, is not obligatory as a duty alone to our-
selves, or to the appellant, but. . . to the State as a whole."4 5
It is apparent from a review of the death penalty cases that
the reasoning behind the exception is inextricably tied up with
due process,4" yet the decisions seldom expressly acknowledge
this." The Court in Edwards v. Commonwealth states the basic
idea: "It is far more important to society and constitutional
government that the accused be accorded a fair and impartial
trial than that he be required to forfeit his life in expiation of
his crime, no matter how guilty the facts fairly adduced might
have proven him to have been."4
Thus the death penalty exception appears simply to be a
safeguard against mistakes of law or fact which is acutely nec-
essary due to the seriousness of the penalty involved.49 Yet it
3 See, e.g., Edwards v. Commonwealth, 182 S.W.2d 948 (Ky. 1944); Graves v.
Commonwealth, 77 S.W.2d 45 (Ky. 1934).
" Edwards v. Commonwealth, 182 S.W.2d 948, 952 (Ky. 1944). See also Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
" Anderson v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.2d 530, 533 (Ky. 1946). See also Smith
v. Commonwealth, 366 S.W.2d 902 (Ky. 1962); Bowman v. Commonwealth, 290
S.W.2d 814 (Ky. 1956).
46 See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
41 See, e.g., Futrell v. Commonwealth, 437 S.W.2d 487, 488 (Ky. 1969).
a 182 S.W.2d 948, 952 (Ky. 1944). In Anderson v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.2d 530
(Ky. 1946), the Court speaks in the same vein, but in more theoretical terms:
Any departure from the well-established procedural rule invoked by the
[Commonwealth] must be derived from the nature of the case and based
on reason, right, and justice rather than on authority .... It must be admit-
ted that the established rule should not be touched except when it becomes
incompatible with justice or right, in which event a departure becomes a
matter nf right rather than a maxim of procedure.
Id. at 533.
"1 "[Slince the most severe penalty known to our law has been inflicted in this
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does not call for a review of all errors, but only those which are
prejudicial to the defendant.ss Viewing this exception in light
of the cases noted in the next subsection of this comment, it
becomes apparent that it is but a special application of the
"palpable error" exception.51
B. The Palpable Error Exception
"A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a
party may be considered. . . by an appellate court on appeal,
even though insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and
appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination that
manifest injustice has resulted from the error."52
case, it is thought proper to take up, not only such objections and exceptions as are of
record, but such as are discussed in appellant's brief." Graves v. Commonwealth, 77
S.W.2d 45, 46 (Ky. 1934). But cf. Bowman v. Commonwealth, 290 S.W.2d 814, 820
(Ky. 1956), a death penalty case in which the Court refused to consider an argument
regarding improper separation of the jury, since the right "to have the jury kept
together during trial is statutory, not constitutional."
"I Bowman v. Commonwealth, 290 S.W.2d 814 (Ky. 1956) must be read in this
light. Otherwise, it would be highly contradictory. The opinion begins by reciting the
death penalty exception as stated in Graves, Edwards, andAnderson. (For some reason
McClure v. Commonwealth, 81 Ky. 448 (1883) is also cited as authority for the death
penalty exception. On its facts, McClure clearly does not belong in this group. If
McClure is read as a due process-"special palpable error" case, however, its inclusion
makes a great deal of sense.) The court in Bowman went on to state that:
[iut was said in the Anderson case that such deviation from the general rule
did not mean its abolition and was limited only to cases where the penalty
was death and there could be no doubt that the errors to which no exceptions
were taken were such as to be highly prejudicial to the accused's substantial
rights.
290 S.W.2d at 817-18. Several readings of Anderson have failed to uncover any express
statement of this principle attributed to it. Yet it may be implicit, considering the
court's long adherence to a "harmless error rule," even in capital cases. See, e.g., Asher
v. Commonwealth, 275 S.W.2d 416 (Ky. 1955); Horton v. Commonwealth, 226 S.W.2d
526 (Ky. 1950); Perkins v. Commonwealth, 223 S.W.2d 997 (Ky. 1949). See also R. Cr.
9.24.
The court affirmed the conviction in Bowman, concluding, somewhat ambigu-
ously (as well as defensively):
In view of the death sentence involved in the instant case, and of our rule in
such cases, the record has been studied carefully, and leniency has been
extended appellant in considering the alleged errors. . . . We.have gone
beyond the limits of the rule in this case and have examined alleged errors
which were not contained in the record but appeared only in appellant's
brief. This is not to be considered as an extension of, or deviation from, our
rule, but is indicative only of the extent of our consideration of the case.
290 S.W.2d at 820.
" See Edwards v. Commonwealth, 182 S.W.2d 948, 951 (Ky. 1944).
s KESmcKy RuLas OF Crvm PRocaEnuR 61.02 [hereinafter cited as R. Civ.]. R.
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There is no easy definition of palpable error,O and the task
of convincing an appellate court that such an error has oc-
curred is even more difficult.In Davis v. Commonwealth, the
Court noted that the palpable error "rule or its application does
not admit of precise definition or limitation. Each case is re-
solved into a matter of judicial discretion in exercising the
inherent power of every court to see that a man's fundamental
rights are protected in every case.
'55
The manner in Which this judicial discretion has been ex-
ercised admits of very little rhyme or reason. The high-water
mark of judicial generosity in this regard is Stone v.
Commonwealth.6 The defendant was convicted of feloniously
taking a payroll check from his employer's office and he was
sentenced to two years in prison. His motion for a new trial,
based on newly discovered evidence, was denied. On appeal, he
again asserted only that ground. The Court reversed, not on the
merits of that argument, but on the basis of an error which had
not been asserted at either the trial or the appellate court level.
Civ. 61.02 is applicable to criminal cases through R. Cr. 13.04. See Stone v. Common-
wealth, 456 S.W.2d 43, 44 (Ky. 1970). See also MuRRELL, supra note 2, at 192; R. Cr.
9.26. "Palpably" was defined in Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen
v. Sears, 10 S.W.2d 287, 289 (Ky. 1928), as "glaringly" or "shockingly." Thus, a
"palpable" error would be one which is "glaring" or "shocking."
-" Emphasis'seems to be on a description of the doctrine, rather than a definition
of the term. One commentator notes: "[Tihis doctrine only applies to errors that
encroach upon substantial rights which cause manifest injustice." Quick, Kentucky
Law Survey-Criminal Procedure, 66 Ky. L.J. 605, 614 (1978) (emphasis added).
"Palpable error" has also been termed "plain" error, "substantial" error, and
"fundamental" error. Id.
" See Davis v. Commonwealth, 162 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1942). See also Futrell v.
Commonwealth, 437 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1969), a "lineup-identification" case. The court
noted that "[v]iolations of constitutional rights, the same as of other rights, may be
waived by failure to make timely and appropriate objection." Id. at 488. The court
went on to describe the possibility of an exception, stating: "Of course, in an aggra-
vated case involving violations of such proportions as in effect to deprive the defendant
of due process the appellate court may grant relief notwithstanding failure to make
proper objection." Id. Unfortunately for this appellant, however, "this [was] not such
a case." Id. See also MURRyLL, supra note 2, at 191-92.
162 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Ky. 1942). In reversing a conviction for forgery as not
supported by the evidence, the Court stated: "An appellate court ought to be sensitive
to the realities, and if it believes there may have been a miscarriage of justice it should
use its extraordinary power and reverse a judgment that there may be a fuller develop-
ment of the facts. ... An extraordinary condition demands extraordinary action."
Id.
", 456 S.W.2d 43 (Ky. 1970).
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The Court, sua sponte, found that the testimony of the Com-
monwealth's key witness was "conclusively refuted" by bank
stamps on the check itself.5 7 Relying on Davis v.
Commonwealth," R. Cr. 9.26, and R. Civ. 61.02, the Stone
court saw a "manifest injustice ... which warrant[ed] a new
trial."",
The courts are constantly reminded by appellants of the
decision. in Stone."0 While the state Supreme Court has spoken
of it in at least one case in terms which indicate disfavor and
disapproval, it has not been overruled."1 The new court of ap-
peals, on the other hand, continues to cite Stone favorably.12
In one case, relying in part on Stone, it reversed an order in
which the trial court refused to set aside a conviction and then
ordered a new trial.6 3
The low-water mark of judicial discretion and prudence
appears to have been reached in several cases"' involving per-
sistent felony offender sentencing. 5 Members of the same
Court which found manifest injustice in Stone consistently af-
firm convictions and life sentences in cases in which the prose-
cution has failed to introduce any evidence whatsoever of one
of the elements of the crime charged, solely because the defense
attorney failed to raise his objection, through a motion for ac-
quittal, or to object to instructions at the proper time." Despite
the United States Supreme Court's mandate that "the Due
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except
17 Id. at 44.
- 162 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Ky. 1942).
"456 S.W.2d at 44.
" See, e.g., Eversole v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 513, 515 (Ky. 1977).
'1 Id. Cf. Ferguson v. Commonwealth, 512 S.W.2d 501, 504 (Ky. 1974), in which
the Stone rule was stated, but the conviction nevertheless affirmed.
u See Salisbury v. Commonwealth, 556 S.W.2d 922, 926 (Ky. App. 1977); Scott
v. Commonwealth, 555 S.W.2d 623,627 (Ky. App. 1977); Anderson v. Commonwealth,
554 S.W.2d 882, 884 (Ky. App. 1977).
" Scott v. Commonwealth, 555 S.W.2d 623, 627 (Ky. App. 1977).
See Rudolph v. Commonwealth, 564 S.W.2d I (Ky. 1978); Kimbrough v. Com-
monwealth, 550 S.W.2d 525 (Ky. 1977); Newell v. Commonwealth, 549 S.W.2d 89 (Ky.
1977).
"Ky. REv. STAT. § 532.080 (1975 Replacement V.ol.) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
" The appellants in both Kimbrough and Newell received life sentences as habit-
ual criminals. Rudolph received a 21-year sentence. See also Hunter v. Common-
wealth, 560 S.W.2d 808 (Ky. 1977), where a murder conviction was affirmed on the
same basis.
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upon reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged," 7 the Kentucky Court refuses
to apply the palpable error exception in these situations.68
Between the extremes of Stone and the recent persistent
felony offender cases are myriads of other situations that could
result in requests for application of the palpable error excep-
tion. In the great majority of cases where error is not properly
preserved at trial, the convictions are simply and summarily
affirmed. The instances in which the courts have been able to
find a "glaring" or "shocking" error which "encroach[es]
upon substantial rights [and] which cause[s] manifest injus-
tice" are very rare. They include a case in which the convic-
tion was not supported by the evidence," a case in which guilt
was conclusively refuted by the evidence,7" a case in which guilt
was determined by an eleven-person jury,72 a case in which
double jeopardy was argued for the first time on appeal,7 3 and
a case in which a probation hearing was not preceded by re-
quired notice. 7Why the palpable error exception does not
come into play in more cases has never been adequately ex-
plained. It may well be that this lack of guidance is responsible
for the frequent reliance on the exception. In any event, the
n In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (emphasis added). Accord, Vachon v.
New Hampshire, 414 U.S. 478 (1974); Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960). In
Rudolph v. Commonwealth, 564 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Ky. 1978), the Court sought to distin-
guish Vachon since in Vachon the issue of sufficiency of evidence had been raised at
trial but the issue in question in Rudolph had not been raised at trial. However, while
this issue was also pressed in the New Hampshire Supreme Court, which affirmed the
conviction, 306 A.2d 781 (N.H. 1973), it was not argued in constitutional terms. Nor
was it "presented by appellant in his jurisdictional statement" in the U.S. Supreme
Court. 414 U.S. at 481 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, the Court considered
the issue under its power to "notice a plain error not presented." Id. at 479 n.3 (major-
ity opinion) (emphasis added).
" The irony of this refusal is further enhanced by the Court itself in Newell v.
Commonwealth, 549 S.W.2d 89 (Ky. 1977). In affirming the conviction, the Court
stated that "[tihis plain failure of the Commonwealth to prove a case under the
persistent felony offender statute was not preserved for appellate review." Id. at 91
(emphasis added).
U Quick, supra note 53, at 614.
? Davis v. Commonwealth, 162 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1942).
' Stone v. Commonwealth, 456 S.W.2d 43 (Ky. 1970).
72 Jackson v. Commonwealth, 299 S.W. 983 (Ky. 1927). The court held that Ky.
CONST. §§ 7, 248 required a jury in a felony case to be composed of twelve persons.
7 Sherley v. Commonwealth, 558 S.W.2d 615, 618 (Ky. 1977).
7, Murphy v. Commonwealth, 551 S.W.2d 838 (Ky. App. 1977).
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very existence of the palpable error exception provides some
hope to most appellants whose trial counsel failed to preserve
objections properly.
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III. CURRENT ArrruDEs TowARD THE RuLE
A. Judicial Reaction to Appellants Who Ignore the Rule
The Kentucky Supreme Court has recently issued a series
of opinions with remarks directed toward appellants and their
attorneys who attempt to raise issues which were not
"preserved for appellate review."76 The remarks range from the
mild suggestion that "[t]his court expects counsel to abide by
its rules,"7 to the lyrical yet pointed reminder that "procedural
requirements... are lights and buoys to mark the channels
of safe passage and assure an expeditious voyage to the right
destination [, whose] importance simply cannot be disdained
or denigrated [, and without which] every trial would end in
a shipwreck,"s to open criticism of the State Public Defender's
Office,' and finally to bitter personal remarks directed toward
II For an interesting case which seems to apply the palpable error exception with-
out using the term, see McClure v. Commonwealth, 81 Ky. 448 (1883).
11 Walker v. Commonwealth, 561 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Ky. 1977). No less than five of
the seven justices have written on the subject. See Shannon v. Commonwealth, 562
S.W.2d 301, 302-03 (Ky. 1978) (Steinberg, J.); Burch v. Commonwealth, 555 S.W.2d
954, 958-59 (Ky. 1977) (Stephenson, J.); Stinnett v. Commonwealth, 553 S.W.2d 55,
55-56 (Ky. 1977) (Reed, C.J.); Brown v. Commonwealth, 551 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Ky.
1977) (Palmore, J.); Eversole v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 513, 515-16 (Ky. 1977)
(Jones, J.).
17 Eversole v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 513, 516 (Ky. 1977).
7, Brown v. Commonwealth, 551 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Ky. 1977). The Court, however,
"recognize[d] that there are cases in which some grave impropriety in the course or
conduct of a trial is so conducive to injustice that procedural blundering must be
waived aside." Id.
71 See, e.g., Burch v. Commonwealth, 555 S.W.2d 954 (Ky. 1977), where the
Court observed that it had "discern[ed] from [its] review of the Public Defender's
brief and arguments over a period of time, a complete lack of comprehension of the
role an appellate court plays in an orderly judicial system." Id. at 959. Stinnett v.
Commonwealth, 553 S.W.2d 55 (Ky. 1977) is even more direct and to the point: "In
our view this appeal is patently meritless and evidences an unnecessary waste of time
and public money." Id. at 56. In this regard, the court's criticism is misdirected. See
KRS § 31.115 (Supp. 1978), Ky. CONST. § 115, and 504 Ky. Admin. Regulations 1:010-
1:070 (1978) which appear to require the Public Defender's Office to prepare and
prosecute an appeal no matter how "meritless." See also notes 103-111 infra and
accompanying text for further discussion of the Public Defender's appellate role.
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the appellant's attorney." Sometimes, though, the Court does
show signs of empathizing with the almost hopeless situation
of an appellant's attorney, where the defendant has been con-
victed in a trial which was reasonably fair, but in which his
attorney failed to raise all possible objections." In one such "no
win contest," the court was prompted to remark: "This record
illustrates the type of situation which prompted the late
Learned Hand to remark that the only thing he could commend
about the appeal was the temerity of counsel in thinking that
it could possibly succeed."
82
In light of the recent harsh statements from the Kentucky
appellate courts, one wonders why attorneys continue, in ap-
peal after appeal, to raise issues which were not properly pre-
served for review. Some may well be unaware of the rule, may
simply overlook it, or wish that it were otherwise. On the other
hand, they may honestly rely on Kentucky case law, statutes,
administrative regulations, and perhaps even the Kentucky
Constitution for the proposition that the rule is not absolutely
impenetrable. This section will explore these rationales.
B. Justifications for Ignoring the Rule
L. Case Law
Kentucky courts have not been entirely unyielding in their
' Shannon v. Commonwealth, 562 S.W.2d 301 (Ky. 1978): "It is fair to say that
counsel for appellant seems to be grasping at straws and that this straw has given way
to the weight of the true facts." Id. at 302.
1, See, e.g., Minor v. Commonwealth, 478 S.W.2d 716 (Ky. 1971), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972); Brown v. Commonwealth, 465 S.W.2d 271 (Ky. 1971); Lewis v.
Commonwealth, 318 S.W.2d 857 (Ky. 1958); Warren v. Commonwealth, 256 S.W.2d
368 (Ky. 1953); Anderson v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.2d 530 (Ky. 1946). See also
Eastham v. Commonwealth, 390 S.W.2d 136 (Ky. 1965); Jones v. Commonwealth, 38
S.W.2d 251 (Ky. 1931); Harrison v. Commonwealth, 559 S.W.2d 744 (Ky. App.
1977).
2 Stinnett v. Commonwealth, 553 S.W.2d 55, 57 (Ky. 1977).
Despite the rhetoric, the courts do not appear to be willing to sanction an
attorney who files and argues such an appeal. But see Blankenship v. Commonwealth,
554 S.W.2d 898, 902 (Ky. App. 1977).
The related question of why trial attorneys fail to preserve errors for review is the
subject of a recent article. Lawson, Presuming Lawyers Competent To Protect Funda-
mental Rights: Is It An Affordable Fiction?, 66 Ky. L.J. 459 (1978). Professor Lawson
suggests that the problem may be "more fundamental" than a lack of knowledge of
the procedural rules regarding preservation of issues. He feels that the "more proba-
ble" reason is a lack of knowledge of substantive criminal and evidence law, or at least
the lack of ability to apply such knowledge in the fast-paced courtroom situation. Id.
at 474.
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approach to appeals in which some issue or other was not raised
at the trial court level." An attorney who is aware of this may,
in the exercise of sound professional judgment, feel justified in
pursuing an appeal, despite shortcomings in his client's trial
defense.
Appellate courts will most frequently reverse a conviction
even though the error was not properly preserved if a palpable
error occurred in the trial court." From the viewpoint of one
facing a prison term, any error committed at trial will no doubt
be regarded as affecting his "substantal rights. . . [and caus-
ing] manifest injustice."8 Given any basis for such a claim and
spurred on by the insistence of his client, it is conceivable that
an attorney's hopes for success in an appeal, when balanced
against the risks, would naturally push him towards proceeding
with the appeal."
Occasional judicial reluctance to apply the rule also gives
attorneys hope in pursuing an appeal. Even disregarding for a
moment those exceptions to the contemporaneous objection
rule which have been recognized, it is far from certain that the
rule always enjoys substantial support and recognition. Recent
opinions from two panels of the new court of appeals contain
language which can be construed as being less than supportive
of the rule." Salisbury v. Commonwealth9 affirmed a convic-
tion for manslaughter, relying in large part on the contempora-
neous objection rule.9" Yet the court did note that "[a] defen-
dant will not always be bound by his attorney's failure to ob-
ject. When the question of waiver arises in a non trial context,
u The exceptions to the contemporaneous objection rule are explored in notes 43-
75 supra.
See notes 52-75 supra for a discussion of this exception.
u R. Civ. 61.02. See R. Cr. 13.04.
In light of Ky. CONST. § 115, it could be argued that any lawyer failing to aid
his client in prosecuting an appeal, no matter how meritless he may think its basis, is
working to deprive his client of a constitutional right. See notes 112-34 infra and
accompanying text for further examination of this argument.
u See Miller v. Commonwealth, CA-1323-MR (Ky. App. Feb. 3, 1978) (Hayes,
Vance and Wintersheimer, JJ.); Salisbury v. Commonwealth, 556 S.W.2d 922 (Ky.
App. 1977) (Grant, Lester and Park, JJ.).
I, 556 S.W.2d 922 (Ky. App. 1977).
N The court cited R. Cr. 9.22. 556 S.W.2d at 926. Professor Quick feels, however,
that Salisbury, in fact, goes beyond the prior Kentucky decisions as well as the spirit
of the rule. Quick, supra note 53, at 616.
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the trial judge may have much greater responsibilities to insure
that there has been a knowing waiver of constitutional rights
by the defendant himself."91 Such a "non trial context" con-
ceivably would include all pre-trial and post-trial hearings and
motions. The court left the impression that procedural blun-
dering in the non-trial context may be remediable under a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.2 This remedy would
thus provide a way around the contemporaneous objection rule.
In Miller v. Commonwealth,3 the appellant had been in-
dicted and convicted of theft by deception. On appeal the court
agreed that it was "highly questionable in this case whether the
proof of the intent to deceive attained the degree of proof re-
quired by KRS 500.070(1)."l The court, however, found itself
bound by recent precedent95 to apply the contemporaneous
objection rule. Although it is easy to read too much into an
opinion, it appears that had there been no recent precedent a
different result might have been reached.
An older Kentucky case is more explicit in its unwilling-
ness to apply the contemporaneous objection rule, yet the rule
was applied and the conviction affirmed. In Warren v.
Commonwealth," the appellant, who had refused court-
appointed counsel, failed to object to inflammatory and incom-
petent evidence of his reputation as a dog thief. On appeal,
" 556 S.W.2d at 927 (emphasis added). The court cited as an example Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), which involved a guilty plea.
2 Salisbury v. Commonwealth, 556 S.W.2d at 927. In general, Kentucky follows
a very strict rule regarding denial of effective assistance of counsel. See Campbell,
Criminal Procedure, 63 Ky. L.J. 702 (1975); Comment, Kentucky's Standard for Inef-
fective Counsel: A Farce and a Mockery?, 63 Ky. L.J. 803 (1975). However, in Blanken-
ship v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d 898 (Ky. App. 1977), the appellant challenged his
conviction under R. Cr. 11.42, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel by reason of
trial counsel's failure to perfect his original appeal. The court applied the standard of
"reasonably competent counsel," id. at 901, rather than the "farce and mockery"
standard, and ruled in appellant's favor.
" CA-1323-MR (Ky. App. Feb. 3, 1978).
" Id.
"In Kimbrough v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 525 (Ky. 1977), the appellant
contended that the Commonwealth had not proved beyond a reasonable doubt all
elements of the charge of which he had been convicted. The Court held he had not
properly preserved the issue for appellate review, and the conviction was affirmed.
Accord, Rudolph v. Commonwealth, 564 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1977); Hunter v. Common-
wealth, 560 S.W.2d 808 (Ky. 1977); Newell v. Commonwealth, 549 S.W.2d 89 (Ky.
1977).
"4256 S.W.2d 368 (Ky. 1953).
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accompanied by counsel, the defendant argued that the evi-
dence should not have been admitted. The Court responded:
"In this particular case, we have some regret that we cannot
overlook this rule of procedure with the same facility with
which the Commonwealth Attorney and Special Judge over-
looked a simple rule of evidence."97 Unfortunately for the ap-
pellant, the Court felt itself bound by the rule.
One of the more interesting aspects of cases involving the
contemporaneous objection rule, and one which may very well
be a cause of the Bar's failure to take complete heed of it, is
the fact that in many cases in which the courts state the rule
and announce that it is being applied, the merits of the appeal
are nevertheless explored." In some cases, the courts seek to
justify examination of the merits, no matter how weak the
justification;" in some no explanation is given;101 and in others,
the contemporaneous objection rule seems to be stated as a
mere afterthought, to add weight to the grounds for affirm-
ance.10" Nevertheless, if the courts intend to treat the rule as
"elementary" or "well settled," as they apparently do, then it
seems incumbent upon them to apply it absolutely, without
stopping to look at the merits.'
Id. at 373.
" See, e.g., Shannon v. Commonwealth, 562 S.W.2d 301 (Ky. 1978); Hunter v.
Commonwealth, 560 S.W.2d 808 (Ky. 1977); Trowel v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d
530 (Ky. 1977); Newell v. Commonwealth, 549 S.W.2d 89 (Ky. 1977); Hatton v. Conm-
monwealth, 409 S.W.2d 818 (Ky. 1966); Grider v. Commonwealth, 398 S.W.2d 496
(Ky. 1966); Lewis v. Commonwealth, 318 S.W.2d 857 (Ky. 1958); Harrison v. Com-
monwealth, 559 S.W.2d 744 (Ky. App. 1977).
" See, e.g., Lewis v. Commonwealth, 318 S.W.2d 857, 859 (Ky. App. 1977), in
which the court explained: "Ordinarily when an issue is presented here before the lower
court has passed on it we decline to take cognizance of it. In this instance we are
addressing ourselves to the questions presented because, since we are affirming the
judgment, we conclude they should not go unanswered."
116 The Court does seem fond of pointing out those cases where the issues raised
are without merit. See, e.g., Newell v. Commonwealth, 549 S.W2d 89, 90 (Ky. 1977)
("pointless, not appropriate to the facts adduced at trial"); Grider v. Commonwealth,
398 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Ky. 1966) ("patently vaporous"). Perhaps the Court feels that
total denial of an appeal is easier for an appellant to accept when he is shown that it
would have failed anyway.
" See, e.g., Shannon v. Commonwealth, 562 S.W.2d 301 (Ky. 1978).
11 Given the fact that the court has recognized a palpable error exception, how-
ever, consideration of the merits appears to be necessary in every case. Unless the
merits of the appeal are explored, the court cannot make a valid determination of
whether palpable error has occurred.
1978-79]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
2. Statutory Justification
Much of the recent criticism by the Kentucky appellate
courts has been directed toward the Kentucky Office of Public
Defender."3 Yet a brief glance at the statute' 4 which provides
for the public defender system shows that much of the criticism
is indeed unwarranted. 5 In Kentucky, a public defender must
perfect an appeal if the client requests an appeal.' A public
defender who fails to carry out the required steps for perfection
of an appeal cannot, according to statute, be paid for the serv-
ices he has performed.'
There is available to the public defender an alternative to
appeal. If the attorney, "after a conscientious examination...
believes the appeal to be wholly frivolous . . . [, he] may
request the court to which the appeal has been taken for per-
mission to withdraw from the case."'0 8 To date, very few such
requests to withdraw have been made.' 9 Even if the public
defender were to withdraw, the appeal would almost certainly
be continued pro se, if not by another attorney, and there
would be no saving of judicial time or money. Besides, the
argument has been made, and is indeed plausible, that the
appellate public defender is essentially an advocate; it is the
court's duty, and not his, to weed out frivolous cases.1'0 More-
over, the appellate attorney may well have an ethical duty to
"continue, to function as advocate and present forcefully any
arguable issue,""' even if he believes the case to be wholly
frivolous.
11 For an article by the state Public Defender explaining the authority and func-
tion of his office, see Farley, The Public Defender System, 41 KENTucKy BENcH AND
BAR No. 2 at 18.
"' KRS ch. 31 (Supp. 1976).
IU But see Blankenship v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d 898, 902 (Ky. App. 1977),
in which the court found "that the public defender system itself was guilty of gross
neglect in. . . los[ing] a case between the trial court and the appellate court."
'" Ky. CONST. § 115; KRS § 31.115 (Supp. 1977); 504 Ky. Admn. Regulations
1:010 (1978). See also Farley, supra note 103, at 18.
107 KRS § 31.115(3) (Supp. 1976).
I" KRS § 31.115(4) (Supp. 1976).
'" See, e.g., Adams v. Commonwealth, 551 S.W.2d 249 (Ky. App. 1977). Accord,
Farley, supra note 103, at 18.
'" Farley, supra note 103 at 18. Accord, Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674 (1958).
See also Brown v. Commonwealth, 465 S.W.2d 270 (Ky. 1971).
"I Farley, supra note 103, at 18. See also CoDE OF PROIESSIONAL RESPONSIBmr,
Canon 7; ABA STANDARDS, Criminal Appeals, § 3.2(b).
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Faced with such statutory and ethical requirements, a
public defender is left with very little choice but to prosecute
an appeal if his client wants one. For the courts to continue
their verbal swipes at the Office of Public Defender is indeed
unfair.
3. The Constitutional Right to an Appeal'
12
"In all cases, civil and criminal, there shall be allowed as
a matter of right at least one appeal to another court .. ."I
So states section 115 of the Kentucky Constitution, as enacted
in 1976. The adoption of section 115 appears at first glance to
provide the basis upon which an appellant may claim and ob-
tain an appeal. The Kentucky Supreme Court has not yet had
an opportunity to construe section 115.114 However, dicta from
a few recent court of appeals opinions, ' plus an examination
,,2 This subsection will explore possible challenges to the rule under the Kentucky
Constitution. It is well settled that the Federal Constitution does not require states to
provide appellate courts. However, if an appellate system is provided by a state, its
facilities may not be arbitrarily denied on the basis of race, wealth, etc. See, e.g.,
Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534 (1975); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974); Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1966); McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894); Thompson v.
Black, 320 F.Supp. 593 (E.D. Ky. 1971); Goins v. Meade, 528 S.W.2d 680 (Ky. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 972 (1976); Perkins v. Commonwealth, 516 S.W.2d 873 (Ky.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 971 (1975); McIntosh v. Commonwealth, 368 S.W.2d 331
(Ky. 1963); Blankenship v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d 898 (Ky. App. 1977).
3 Ky. CONST. § 115. The "right to an appeal" is thus a constitutional right.
Blankenship v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d 898 (Ky. App. 1977); Yocom v. Franklin
County Fiscal Court, 545 S.W.2d 296 (Ky. App. 1976); Farley, supra note 103 at 41
n.3.
Prior to January 1, 1976, when Ky. CONST. § 115 went into effect, the right to an
appeal was merely statutory, and "the General Assembly [had] the power to change
or modify said right." Ky. CONST. § 127 (repealed 1976). See, e.g., Perkins v. Common-
wealth, 516 S.W.2d 873 (Ky. 1974); Commonwealth v. Jones, 49 S.W.2d 546 (Ky.
1932); Slater v. Commonwealth, 40 S.W.2d 389 (Ky. 1931); Wireman v. Common-
wealth, 279 S.W. 633 (Ky. 1926); McLaughlin v. Commonwealth, 232 S.W. 628 (Ky.
1921); Hoskins v. Commonwealth, 221 S.W. 230 (Ky. 1920); Davidson v. Common-
wealth, 192 S.W. 846 (Ky. 1917); Overstreet v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W. 751 (Ky.
1912); Rutherford v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 639 (1880).
114 But see Stephens v. Goodenough, 560 S.W. 2d 556 (Ky. 1977), where the
Court held in an appeal to the Supreme Court from an original action in the court of
appeals, that the right guaranteed by § 115 was properly exercised by direct appeal
rather than by motion for discretionary review.
W" See Blankenship v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d 898 (Ky. App. 1977); Cobb v.
Carpenter, 553 S.W.2d 290 (Ky. App. 1977); Yocom v. Franklin County Fiscal Court,
545 S.W.2d 296 (Ky. App. 1976).
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of opinions which preceded adoption of section 115,116 may give
some insight into the meaning of the amendment.
From 1854, when appeals in criminal cases were first al-
lowed,"1 7 until the adoption of section 115, it was repeatedly
held "that the right of appeal is purely a thing of legislative
creation, and the right of appeal in a criminal action has no
basis in any constitutional guarantee." ' The right of appeal
was thus defined by the statute which announced the right.,
Given the power to grant or withhold or regulate the right of
appeal, the legislature did so, first through the Criminal Code,
and later through the Rules of Criminal Procedure and the
statutes. Those rules as applied by the courts accurately re-
flected the law before the adoption of section 115.
With the adoption of section 115120 and its companion arti-
cle, section 116,121 the situation appears to be very much
changed. The legislature no longer has the power to grant or
withhold the right of appeal; that right is now embodied in the
constitution. Nor may the courts deny an appellant his one
appeal. The Supreme Court, not the legislature, has the power
to regulate appellate procedure.122 Perhaps most significantly
there is no longer a "wide discretion"' 2 in the scope of proce-
dural rules. The role of procedural rules is stated plainly:
' See note 113 supra, for a list of these cases.
, See 1854 CRIMINAL CODE §§ 277, 334, 348 which allowed an appeal and gov-
erned the procedures involved. Contra, REwsE STATURES OF KErrUcK § 1(1) (Wick-
liffe, Turner & Nicholas 1852).
I' McLaughlin v. Commonwealth, 232 S.W. 628, 628 (Ky. 1921). See also Perkins
v. Commonwealth, 516 S.W.2d 873 (Ky. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 971 (1975);
Owens v. Commonwealth, 222 S.W. 524 (Ky. 1920); Miller v. Commonwealth, 105
S.W. 899 (Ky. 1907).
"I "In other words, the appeal must be prosecuted, if at all, in the time and way,
and from such decisions of the trial court as the Legislature has provided for."
McLaughlin v. Commonwealth, 232 S.W. at 628.
'1 "In all cases, civil and criminal, there shall be allowed as a matter of right at
least one appeal to another court. . . . Procedural rules shall provide for expeditious
and inexpensive appeals. Appeals shall be upon the record and not by trial de novo."
Ky. CONST. § 115.
2I "The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe rules governing its
appellate procedure . . . and rules of practice and procedure for the Court of Jus-
tice. . . ." Ky. CONST. § 116.
122 Id.
"n Overstreet v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W. 751 (Ky. 1912).
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"Procedural rules shall provide for expeditious and inexpensive
appeals."'24
The significance of the fact that the right to an appeal is
now constitutional rather than statutory cannot be fully appre-
ciated without a brief glance at some recent cases. In Perkins
v. Commonwealth's an indigent defendant was convicted of
murder. His attorney failed to file notice of appeal within ten
diys,128 "so the right of appeal was lost."'2 Later, the defendant
moved the court to reinstate his right to appeal, but the motion
was denied. From that denial, he appealed, and the Court af-
firmed. In Blankenship v. Commonwealth,121 the court dis-
cussed Perkins and section 115:
[In Perkins] the court relied heavily upon the principle that
appellate review in criminal cases was not a constitutional
right. In light of the subsequent adoption of Section 115 of the
Kentucky Constitution which does guarantee a criminal de-
fendant one appeal as a matter of right, this basis for the
Perkins decision would not apply to judgments entered after
January 1, 1976.121
A 1976 civil case in the new court of appeals lends some
additional insight into section 115. In Yocom v. Franklin
County Fiscal Court,3 ' two cases were consolidated for a hear-
ing before the court of appeals sitting en banc, on motions to
dismiss appeals. The notices of appeal did not comply with the
rule pertaining to the filing of appeals that was in effect at the
time the notices were filed although they did comply with the
previous rule. 3' The court nonetheless allowed the appeals on
M Ky. CONST. § 115. An example of such a rule would be R. Civ. 73.02(1) (amend-
ment effective July 1, 1976), which requires that notice of appeal must be filed within
20 days of the final judgment or final order. See also R. Cr. 12.54
I2 516 S.W.2d 873 (Ky. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 971 (1975).
I' See R. Cr. 12.54.
127 516 S.W.2d at 873.
In 554 S.W.2d 898 (Ky. App. 1977).
I" Id. at 900. Unfortunately for the defendant in Blankenship, his conviction had
also been entered before January 1, 1976. Nevertheless, the court was able to find that
he had been denied effective assistance of counsel. The order denying belated appeal
was reversed. Id. at 902-03.
£21 545 S.W.2d 296 (Ky. App. 1976).
22£ "In each case, a motion to dismiss the appeal has been filed on the ground that
the notice of appeal failed to specify all of the appellees as required by CR 73.03." Id.
at 296.
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the authority of R. Civ. 86(2),11 and it did so, "[h]aving in
mind the new policy of Section 115 of the Kentucky Constitu-
tion that there shall be as a matter of right one appeal in every
case."3
The very words of section 115, along with the language of
the recent cases, certainly indicate that a new importance is to
be accorded the right to an appeal in Kentucky. The very fact
that this right has now achieved constitutional stature puts it
on a higher plane than its statutory predecessor. 13U The man-
date seems clear: an appeal is not to be denied simply to pro-
mote the convenience of the court. While it is true that sections
115 and 116 do not strip the judicial system of the means to
carry out its duty in an orderly manner, it seems from their
plain language that unless the rule can be justified as providing
for greater expedition or reduction of costs, and unless this
interest outweighs the individual's constitutional right to be
heard on appeal, it is not valid. The contemporaneous objec-
tion rule does little, if anything, to expedite or lessen the costs
of appeals. The cases are still going to the appellate courts, and
often the merits are still being heard.
Whether the rationale of Blankenship and Yocom v.
Franklin County Fiscal Court should be extended to cover con-
temporaneous objection cases is an issue which clearly must be
addressed by the courts. Unlike the rules involved in those
cases,'3 the contemporaneous objection rule usually does not
t"I R. Civ. 86(2):
(2) The original rules and any amendments thereto govern all proceedings
in actions brought after they take effect and also further proceedings in
actions then pending, except to the extent that in the opinion of the proper
court, expressed by its order, their application in a particular action pending
when the original rules or amendments thereto take effect would not be
feasible, or would work injustice, in which event the procedure existing at
the time the action was brought applies.
' Yocom v. Franklin County Fiscal Court, 545 S.W.2d at 299. Yocom was decided
on December 3, 1976. The court extended attorneys in the Commonwealth a grace
period until January 1, 1977, in which to familiarize themselves with all the new
amendments. "After that date... members of the bar will be expected to comply
with the rule amendments." Id.
"I The right's new stature and the constitutional provisions which embody it
indicate a public policy that it is in no way to be limited by the legislature. There is
nothing to indicate that the courts are empowered to carry out the limiting function
previously exercised by the legislature, nor even the limiting function it previously
exercised on authority granted it by the legislature.
I Blankenship v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d 898 (Ky. App. 1977), involved a
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completely bar an appeal - some issue is usually preserved -
but there may be a good reason to extend the reasoning of those
cases to cases which involve the contemporaneous objection
rule. The rule often guts an appeal by depriving the appellant
of his most effective argument or arguments. It effectively de-
nies the appellant his right to an appeal, for without the ability
to raise certain issues, any appeal which is granted may be a
worthless, empty shell masquerading as a valuable constitu-
tional right.
CONCLUSION
The contemporaneous objection rule has lived a long life
in the Kentucky courts. It has been justified in terms of judicial
efficiency and economy, fairness to the court, and fairness to
the defendant himself. Despite the fact that it is entrenched in
the case law and procedural rules, the time has come for a
careful reexamination of it by the Kentucky Supreme Court.
In 1854, when the rule was first stated, the right to an appeal
in a criminal case was statutory, and the right had only re-
cently been announced. Today this right has been elevated to
constitutional stature. In 1854, a four-member court of appeals
was the sole body for hearing all the appeals in the Common-
wealth; today, a seven-member Supreme Court and a fourteen-
member court of appeals share the workload. While the sheer
volume of appellate cases has obviously multiplied many,
many times in those years, today's improvements in transpor-
tation, communication, and legal tools undoubtedly make
today's courts better equipped and more accessible than their
forebearers. Thus, some traditional justifications for the rule
have lost part of their validity.
There is some justification for the rule. In Wainwright v.
Sykes,' for example, Mr. Justice Rehnquist listed several ben-
efits of a contemporaneous objection rule in addition to those
failure to perfect an appeal in a timely fashion. See notes 128.29 and accompanying
text supra. Yocom v. Franklin County Fiscal Court, 545 S.W.2d 296 (Ky. App. 1976),
involved a failure to file a timely appeal. See note 133 and accompanying text
supra. Thus the bar to appeal in these cases was an all-or-nothing question. On the
other hand, the contemporaneous objection rule only prohibits the hearing of certain
issues and does not prohibit the appeal absolutely.
'' 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
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traditionally noted by the Kentucky courts. ' However, the
question is not whether such justifications, of whatever valid-
ity, can be conjured up and listed. Rather, a serious qualitative
analysis must be undertaken to determine whether these sup-
posed interests outweigh the interest of this state, as expressed
in its constitution, to guarantee an open appellate court door
to the criminal defendant who loses at trial.
An equally serious element to be considered in this balanc-
ing formula was thoughtfully considered by Mr. Justice Bren-
nan in his dissenting opinion in Wainwright v. Sykes. In his
view, the contemporaneous objection rule usually comes into
play as a result of the "inadvertence, negligence, inexperience,
or incompetence of trial counsel." 3 ' Foreclosing an appeal
under such circumstances is particularly suspect. As Justice
Brennan stated:
Punishing a lawyer's unintentional errors by closing the
... courthouse door to his client is both a senseless and
misdirected method of deterring the slighting of state rules.
It is senseless because unplanned and unintentional action of
any kind generally is not subject to deterrence .... And it
is a misdirected sanction because even if the penalization of
incompetence or carelessness will encourage more thorough
legal training and trial preparation, the [appellant], as op-
posed to his lawyer, hardly is the proper recipient of such a
penalty.
-13 9
The present practice of interpreting the contemporaneous
objection rule strictly and articulating a palpable error escape
"I In holding that failure to abide by the Florida contemporaneous objection rule
barred federal habeas corpus review, he listed these justifications and benefits: (1)
"the record... with respect to the constitutional claim [is made] when the recollec-
tions are freshest, not years later," id. at 88; (2) "the judge who observed the demeanor
of [the] witnesses [is able] to make the factual determinations necessary for properly
deciding the federal constitutional question," id.; (3) the rule makes "a major contri-
bution to finality in criminal litigation," id.; (4) "objection on the spot may force the
prosecution to take a hard look at its hole card ... the possibility of reversal by the
state appellate courts or ... federal habeas corpus," id. at 89; (5) litigants are forced
to perceive a state criminal trial "as a decisive and portentous event," id. at 90. The
Court added: "Any procedural rule which encourages the result that [a trial] be as
free of error as possible is thoroughly desirable, and the contemporaneous objection
rule surely falls within this classification." Id.
433 U.S. at 104 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 113.
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valve will not be easy to replace. Whether or not a reexamina-
tion would lead the Court to a loosening of either the rule or
the exception, however, it seems incumbent on them to give
some realistic content to the concept of "palpable error." As
now stated and applied, the exception is seldom used, virtually
meaningless, and almost wholly worthless. In fact, in its pres-
ent condition, it may do more harm than good. The appellant's
hopes are falsely raised by it, and courts must contend with a
large caseload inevitably (and uselessly) increased by the faint
glimmer of hope which it does provide.
Examination of an analogous area may be of some aid. The
federal courts have had the opportunity, in habeas corpus pro-
ceedings, to examine state contemporaneous objection rules.
Their solution to the problems presented by such a rule cur-
rently entails a standard of "cause" and "prejudice."140 The
goal of this test, like that of the palpable error exception, is to
grant relief to a criminal defendant when there has been "a
miscarriage of justice" ' and the defendant can show cause
(e.g., an "explanation . .'. for his failure to object at trial"42),
and prejudice (e.g., a showing that the evidence, in general,
was not so substantial so as to "negate any possibility of actual
prejudice" 143). The precise content of the applicable standard
is admittedly far from clear at present. "4 However, the develop-
'" See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S.
536 (1976). See also Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 242 (1973).
' Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 91.
42 Id.
14. Id.
'" In the latest relevant Supreme Court decision, the Court avoided giving the
standard any precise meaning. Id.Cf. id. at 98 (White, J., concurring) and at 117
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (both suggesting that the "prejudice" test may be akin to
the harmless error doctrine). Under the harmless error doctrine, "[clonstitutional
error which may have contributed to the conviction is presumed to be prejudicial
unless the reviewing court can declare that it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt." T. FrIZGERALD, 8 KENTUCKY PR cncE - CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 491
n.25 (1978). One commentator, however, suggests "that the Sykes prejudice test is
significantly less stringent than the harmless error doctrine," in other words, the "stan-
dard is more difficult for a prisoner to overcome than the harmless error test."
Rosenberg, Jettisoning Fay v. Noia: Procedural Defaults by Reasonably Incompetent
Counsel, 62 MINN. L. REv. 341, 399-400 and 399 n.259 (1978).
The present uncertainty also exists with respect to the "cause" standard. See
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977). See also Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S.
536 (1976); Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
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ment of a meaningful palpable error exception would certainly
be furthered by a careful observation of past and future habeas
corpus decisions.'45
Matthew Fritz
' For lower court cases attempting to apply these standards, see e.g., Satterfield
v. Zahradnik, 572 F.2d 443, 446 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 2270 (1978);
.Sincox v. United States, 571 F.2d 876, 879-80 (5th Cir. 1978); McDonald v. Estelle,
564 F.2d 199, 200 (5th Cir. 1977) (mem.); Rinehart v. Brewer, 561 F.2d 126, 130 n.6
(8th Pir. 1977); Jiminez v. Estelle, 557 F.2d 506, 510 (5th Cir. 1977); Bromwell v.
Williams, 445 F Supp. 106, 114 (D. Md. 1977).
